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[Forthcoming European Equality Law Review] 
 
The New Architecture of EU Equality Law after CHEZ: Did the Court of 
Justice reconceptualise direct and indirect discrimination? 
 
Christopher McCrudden* 
 
Introduction 
 
The Court of Justice’s decision of the 16 July 2015, in Case C-83/14 CHEZ 
Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, is a critically 
important case for two main reasons. First, it represents a further step along the 
path of addressing ethnic discrimination against Roma communities in Europe, 
particularly in Bulgaria, where the case arises.  Second, it provides interpretations 
(sometimes controversial interpretations) of core concepts in the EU anti-
discrimination Directives that will be drawn on in the application of equality law 
well beyond Bulgaria, and well beyond the pressing problem of ethnic 
discrimination against Roma.  
 
This article will focus particularly on the second issue, the potentially 
broader implications of the case. In particular, it will ask whether the Court of 
Justice’s approach in CHEZ is subtly redrawing the boundaries of EU equality law 
in general, in particular by expanding the concept of direct discrimination, or 
whether the result and the approach adopted is sui generis, one depending on the 
particular context of the case and the fact that it involves allegations of 
discrimination against Roma, and therefore of limited general application. 
 
CHEZ in the Bulgarian context 
 
Before turning to these broader issues, however, the importance of the case in the 
Bulgarian context deserves attention. For many years, a practice has been operated 
by CHEZ, one of the major Bulgarian suppliers of domestic electricity, of 
distinguishing between urban districts in the way in which electricity meters were 
provided to consumers of its electricity.1 In urban areas which were inhabited 
mainly by persons of Roma origin, the meters were placed on pylons forming part 
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1 The facts stated here are abstracted from the more detailed finding of the CJEU, at paragraphs [21] 
to [23]. 
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of the overhead electricity supply network at a height of between six and seven 
meters; by contrast, in other areas, they were placed at a height of 1.70 meters, 
usually on the consumer’s own property. The reason that CHEZ gave for the 
difference was that it was necessary to place the meters higher in certain areas in 
order to prevent fraud, in particular by making unlawful connections to the 
electricity supply by people in these areas more difficult. The areas chosen were 
those in which the problem of illegal connections and tampering with the meters 
was particularly prevalent.  
 
The national equality body in Bulgaria, Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia 
(KZD), has for many years been concerned with what they consider the unlawful 
discrimination against Roma that this practice involved, and it has issued several 
findings of unlawful discrimination against CHEZ in this regard, which are routinely 
appealed to the Bulgarian courts. Issues of both Bulgarian and EU equality law arise 
in these cases. In a previous case, KZD itself referred questions regarding the 
interpretation of EU equality law to the CJEU on a preliminary reference, but the 
CJEU held that it had no jurisdiction to consider the matter because KZD was not 
a court and therefore could not refer questions to the CJEU.2 In that case, Advocate 
General Kokott provided an extensive Opinion on the merits of the discrimination 
issue.3  
 
And there matters stood until the latest case, which is the subject of this 
article, in which the Bulgarian administrative court, hearing an appeal by CHEZ 
against a finding of KZD, referred an elaborate set of questions to the CJEU, which 
accepted jurisdiction because in this case the referring body was a court, and 
replied with a reasoned judgment addressing the substantive issues raised by the 
questions put. Again, Advocate General Kokott provided a detailed opinion.4 Judge 
Prechal was the Judge-Rapporteur. Both, of course, have extensive experience in 
dealing with discrimination issues. 
 
The decision of the CJEU in CHEZ is unlikely to be the end of the Bulgarian 
litigation, since the responses by the CJEU to the questions put will require the 
referring Bulgarian court to engage in further extensive fact-finding and application 
of EU law to those facts, as well as considering whether Bulgarian anti-
discrimination law adequately implements EU law in several respects. It will be of 
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considerable interest in the context of Roma rights to see how the Bulgarian court 
deals with the answers provided by the Court of Justice. The CHEZ case looks set 
to make the CJEU a key element in future Roma rights litigation strategy, as the 
European Court of Human Rights has been in the past. 
 
Broader issues considered 
 
Turning to the broader questions to which the case potentially gives rise, these can 
usefully be divided into four areas of EU equality law interpretation, and the 
remainder of the article will address each of these in turn: (i) the implications of 
the case for the use of the EU equality directives prohibiting ethnic discrimination 
in non-Roma contexts; (ii) the meaning of “direct” discrimination; (iii) the scope of 
“indirect” discrimination; and (iv) the appropriate way in courts applying EU ant-
discrimination law should address the “justification” issue in indirect discrimination.  
 
All, except the first of these, have potentially considerable importance for 
each of the equality directives, whether concerned with ethnic discrimination or 
not, because the Court’s reasoning engages both with the meaning of concepts that 
are common to all the directives (“direct discrimination”, “indirect discrimination”, 
and “justification”) and with the implications these have for litigation practice 
across all of these directives in so far as they address “indirect discrimination” (who 
can take cases of indirect discrimination?). This article will first suggest what these 
broader implications may be, before turning finally to the question of whether, 
despite these potentially broader implications, the case should be seen as driven 
by the context of the particular facts of the case, and in particular whether it should 
be seen as primarily driven by the type and degree of discrimination against Roma 
prevalent in central and eastern Europe in particular. 
 
Implications for “ethnic” discrimination litigation 
 
One of the recurring issues that arises in the context of “ethnic” discrimination is 
what is meant by the term “ethnic”, and in which contexts the term applies. This 
issue is particularly acute where, as in several European states, there is 
considerable unease regarding “racial” categories, which are seen as dangerously 
close to accepting the long-discredited myth that there is a scientific basis for racial 
differences. In such contexts, the use of the “ethnic” criterion seems less 
controversial because it does not have the tainted associations of “racial” 
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categories. But what is “ethnicity” for the purposes of Council Directive 
2000/43/EC?5 
 
The CHEZ case provides intriguing answers to this question. To understand 
why, we need to understand several aspects of the way in which the case was 
presented. The case involves an allegation of direct and indirect discrimination 
against CHEZ by Anelia Nikolova, who runs a grocer’s shop in the district of a town 
which is inhabited mainly by persons of Roma origin. There were several 
complications in her case. The first complication was that Ms Nikolova originally 
presented the case in the Bulgarian legal proceedings as a case of discrimination 
on grounds of “nationality”, but the Bulgarian proceedings were conducted on the 
basis that the case concerned an allegation of ethnic discrimination under the 
Directive (discrimination on the basis of nationality is expressly excluded from the 
coverage of the Directive).6 The second complicating factor was that the Bulgarian 
court regarded Ms Nikolova’s allegation of ethnic discrimination against her as 
based on her identifying with the Roma community in the district in which she 
traded,7 and therefore as of Roma ethnicity, but she stated before the CJEU that 
she was not herself Roma, and the CJEU did not base their finding on any 
“identification” theory.8  
 
We shall see the implications of these issues for the interpretation of direct 
and indirect discrimination generally in a moment, but the issue on which the article 
will focus first, is how the Court approached the meaning of “ethnicity” in general, 
and Ms Nikolova’s ethnicity in particular.  
 
Advocate General Kokott first noted that, from a “European perspective,” 
“the Roma are to be regarded as a separate ethnic group who also require special 
protection,”9 simply citing the European Court of Human Rights decision in DH v 
Czech Republic,10 but giving no further explanation. The Grand Chamber went 
somewhat further, however. In a brief, but significant, holding, the Court 
considered that “the concept of ethnicity … has its origin in the idea of societal 
groups marked in particular by common nationality, religious faith, language, 
																																																						
5 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (OJ 2000 L 180, p. 22). 
6 CJEU, at paragraph [26]; AG, at paragraph [29]. 
7 CJEU, at paragraph [26]; AG, at paragraph [29]. 
8 CJEU, at paragraph [49]. 
9 AG, at paragraph [43]. 
10 D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. 57325/00. 
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cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds.”11 Applying this “objective” 
understanding, Roma constituted an ethnic group, with the Court not only citing 
with apparent approval the ECtHR’s decision in DH, but also those in Nachova v 
Bulgaria,12 and Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia.13 The implications of this approach in the 
EU context in cases where groups other than Roma are involved remains to be 
seen, and we can expect references to the Court seeking further explanations, for 
example concerning whether all the criteria in the list need to be satisfied before a 
group can be considered as constituting an “ethnic” group, or merely some, and if 
so which, and what the differences are between “ethnicity” and “nationality”, and 
between “ethnicity” and “religion”.14 
 
And what of Ms Nikolova’s ethnicity? In contrast to the “objective” standard 
adopted regarding what an ethnic group is, a much more “subjective” approach is 
adopted, by Advocate General Kokott at least, as regards whether a particular 
person is to be regarded as a member of the ethnic group in question. The “mere 
finding that the Roma are a separate group,” she observed, was “not sufficient in 
itself to provide a satisfactory answer” to the question of whether, under the 
Directive, Ms Nikolova “may rely on the prohibition of discrimination based on 
ethnic origin”.15 One way in which plaintiffs might be able to do so would be if the 
plaintiff herself belonged to the Roma ethnic group, and Advocate General Kokott 
makes clear that “[i]n case of doubt, self-identification by the individual concerned 
continues to be the determining factor in assessing whether or not he or she is to 
be regarded as a member of the ethnic group in question.”16 The Grand Chamber 
did not address the issue directly. If Advocate General Kokott’s approach stands, 
then problematic issues may arise, such as whether, in a case of alleged indirect 
discrimination, an individual may simply opt-in to an ethnic group that would itself 
deny membership to that individual?17 For reasons that we will consider in a 
moment, that problem may be reduced in significance because of another aspect 
of the Court’s judgment, concerning “discrimination by association”. 
																																																						
11 Appearing to apply the approach to ethnicity articulated by the United Kingdom final court, the House 
of Lords (before it became the Supreme Court), in Mandla v Lee, although that case is not cited by the 
CJEU. 
12 Nachova v Bulgaria, no. 43577/98.  
13 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia Herzogovina, nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06. 
14 For further discussion, see Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, Courts and Consociations: 
Human Rights versus Power-sharing (OUP, 2013), 121ff. 
15 AG, at paragraph [44]. 
16 AG, at paragraph [50]. 
17 See, for example, the decision of the UK Supreme Court in E v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 
15. A boy claimed admission to a Jewish school on the basis that he was Jewish, arising from his self-
identification with Judaism. He was refused admission on the basis that his mother was not Jewish, 
either by birth or conversion, and he had not himself converted to Judaism, and that according to Jewish 
law (Halacha), he was not considered to be Jewish even though he self-identified as a Jew. The author 
was Junior Counsel representing JFS in this case. 
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The meaning of “direct” discrimination 
 
The concept of “direct” discrimination is at one and the same time both central to 
the architecture of the EU equality directives, and highly problematic in its 
meaning. This centrality, combined with its uncertain meaning, is a recipe for 
litigation, and this issue has dominated much anti-discrimination litigation in the 
domestic courts of several Member States, particularly as equality law has 
expanded exponentially over the last ten years. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
it should also be a central issue in the context of path breaking cases such as CHEZ.  
 
There are several linked issues that complicate a legal understanding of 
direct discrimination. One issue is whether the concept should be seen as primarily 
addressing discrimination against individuals or groups. A second critical issue is 
whether it should be seen from the perspective of the alleged perpetrator or from 
the perspective of the alleged victim, and this question is often linked to the issue 
of whether, and if so how far, the discriminatory intention of the perpetrator is 
relevant. A third complicating factor is what precisely the relationship is, legally, 
between direct and indirect discrimination. We know, of course, that in most 
circumstances direct discrimination cannot be “justified”, whereas indirect 
discrimination incorporates an idea of justification into the concept itself, but what, 
in particular, is the added value of the concept of indirect discrimination, and what 
effect should this have on the scope of direct discrimination?  
 
As in the domestic context, a critical question in the interpretation of direct 
discrimination is what discrimination “on the grounds of” a particular protected 
characteristic (such as ethnicity) involves. In the CHEZ case, the issue was further 
complicated by one of the features of the case mentioned above: viz. that Ms 
Nikolova complained of direct ethnic discrimination against her, even though she 
was not herself a member of the ethnic group that she said was the target of the 
less favourable treatment. 
 
The approach that Advocate General Kokott adopted was to interpret the 
concept of direct discrimination as applying not only to persons who were members 
of the targeted group but also to those “associated” with that group, developing 
further the concept of “discrimination by association,” as she termed it, which the 
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CJEU first adopted in the Coleman case.18 In Coleman, the Court held, for example, 
that discrimination against person A because of their association with person B who 
is disabled, on the ground of the disability of person B, constituted discrimination 
against A on the grounds of disability. In other words, discrimination “on the 
grounds of” a protected characteristic did not depend on the person discriminated 
against having, or being perceived to have, these characteristics; Council Directive 
2000/78/EC19 did not prohibit discrimination only “on the grounds of [the victim’s]” 
protected characteristics, but other’s as well. 
 
As applied to the facts of the CHEZ case itself, Ms Nikolova was permitted 
to allege that she had been directly discriminated against on grounds of ethnicity; 
she was treated less favourably because she lived in a Roma-dominated district. 
As Advocate General Kokott says: “The contested practice by CHEZ is directed in a 
wholesale and collective manner at all persons who are supplied with electricity by 
that undertaking” in that district.20 She continues: “Should it transpire hereinafter 
that this practice entails discrimination against the Roma living in that district, the 
wholesale and collective character of the practice means that inevitably 
‘discrimination by association’ is also suffered by those who are not themselves 
Roma,” including Ms Nikolova.21 
 
There are several important issues arising from different elements in the 
approaches taken to the meaning of direct discrimination as set out above.  The 
first involves the concept of “discrimination by association”. Apart from the fact 
that the CJEU is careful to avoid using this term, the Advocate General and the 
Court subtlety differ on when it arises. The broadest approach is that set out by 
the Advocate General. She finds that it arises “first and foremost, by those who are 
in a close personal relationship with a person possessing one of the [protected] 
characteristics”,22 such as was the case in Coleman itself. She goes on, however, 
to make clear that “the existence of such a personal link is certainly not the only 
conceivable criterion for regarding a person as suffering ‘discrimination by 
association’.”23 In an important, if controversial, sentence she continues: “The fact 
that the measure at issue is discriminatory by association may be inherent in the 
measure itself, in particular where that measure is liable, because of its wholesale 
																																																						
18 Coleman v Attridge Law, C-303/06, European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 17 July 2008. 
19 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16). 
20 AG, at paragraph [60]. 
21 AG, at paragraph [60]. 
22 AG, at paragraph [57]. 
23 AG, at paragraph [58]. 
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and collective character, to affect not only the person possessing one of the 
[protected] characteristics … but also – as a kind of ‘collateral damage’ – includes 
other persons.”24  
 
The CJEU itself addresses this issue in language that is potentially equally 
broad, if in a different way. The requirement of equal treatment, the Court says, 
“applies not to a particular category of person but by reference to the grounds 
mentioned … so that principle is intended to benefit also persons who, although not 
themselves a member of the [protected] group concerned, nevertheless suffer less 
favourable treatment or a particular disadvantage on one of those grounds.”25 The 
Court’s approach is relatively uncontroversial in so far as it regards as direct 
discrimination a situation where person A treats person B less favourably because 
of person C’s protected characteristics – that is Coleman, and now CHEZ. But the 
question that the Advocate General’s and the Court’s language gives rise to, and 
which may generate further references to the CJEU, is how far beyond the 
Coleman- and CHEZ-type situations, “discrimination by association” goes.  
 
To take one topical example that is currently the subject of litigation in the 
United Kingdom under domestic anti-discrimination law,26 would it amount to direct 
discrimination for person A to treat person B less favourably on the grounds of A’s 
protected characteristics, completely ignoring B’s and C’s characteristics? The issue 
arose in the following way: the applicant (B), who was gay, requested that a cake 
be made for him by a bakery (A), the directors of which were Christian, and whose 
religious and political beliefs were opposed to same sex marriage. Same sex 
marriage is not permitted in Northern Ireland, unlike the rest of the United 
Kingdom. The cake requested was to be iced with the message “support gay 
marriage”. The bakery refused because the directors objected to the message, but 
were otherwise quite prepared to serve the customer, and had done so in the past. 
The customer wanted to bring the cake with the message to a party which was to 
celebrate the end of “anti-homophobia week, which would be attended by several 
people who were gay (C). A cake, with the requested message, was subsequently 
prepared by another bakery and was brought to the party by B. The directors of 
the bakery argued that they neither knew nor cared whether B or C were gay; they 
objected to the message on the cake, not the characteristics of B or C. The court 
																																																						
24 AG, at paragraph [58]. 
25 CJEU, at paragraph [56]. 
26 Lee v Ashers, Northern Ireland County Court, 19 May 2015, available at: < 
http://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Cases%20and%20Settlements/2015/Lee-v-
Ashers_Judgement.pdf> currently on appeal to the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. The author is 
Junior Counsel representing Ashers in this case. 
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held, however, that the actions of A amounted to unlawful discrimination “on the 
grounds of” sexual orientation and political belief; in this case, it was the beliefs 
and sexual orientation of A, rather than B or C that was relevant. The case is 
currently under appeal. The issues arise under domestic law, rather than EU law, 
but they neatly illustrate the type of situation that can arise for decision under the 
expanded approach to the phrase “on the ground of” that the Advocate General 
and the Court of Justice have now adopted. 
 
Leaving these questions aside, the CHEZ judgment is also important for 
what it says about the meaning of direct discrimination more generally. The interest 
arises because of the Advocate General’s and the Court’s approach to whether 
CHEZ’s practice entailed direct discrimination against Roma living in that district. 
The answer from the Advocate General was ‘no’,27 whereas the CJEU suggests that 
it may be, and sets out the type of issues the referring court needs to consider 
further.28 On this critical issue, then, there is some apparent difference between 
the CJEU and Advocate General Kokott.  
 
The Advocate General sets out two different ways in which it might be 
argued that direct discrimination arises. First, the contested practice might have 
been chosen by the company “on the basis of the ethnic origin of the inhabitants” 
of the district.29 On this issue, she holds that there are “no specific indications either 
in the order for reference or in the observations submitted by the parties to the 
proceedings to suggest that the contested practice was chosen specifically” on that 
basis.30 Alternatively, the contested practice might be considered directly 
discriminatory “where a measure is apparently neutral, but actually affects or is 
capable of affecting only persons possessing” the protected characteristic.31 On this 
issue, she also held that these circumstances did not exist in this case.  
 
The CJEU did not address the Advocate General’s second approach, but in 
the case of the first, the Court was unwilling to follow the Advocate General’s 
conclusion. Instead, the Court identified what would be needed for a finding of 
direct discrimination of that type to be found, and urged the referring court to 
engage in thorough fact-finding in order to determine whether the districts had 
been targeted specifically because they were Roma-dominated. 
																																																						
27 AG, at paragraph [87]. 
28 CJEU, at paragraph [80]. 
29 AG, at paragraph [81]. 
30 AG, at paragraph [81]. 
31 AG, at paragraph [82]. 
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The potential importance of the case lies more in the second approach taken 
by the Advocate General than that of the CJEU. If this second approach reflects the 
position under EU equality law, what type of measure is “apparently neutral, but 
actually affects or is capable of affecting only persons possessing a certain 
[protected] characteristic”? The term used subsequently by the Advocate General 
is that the measure must be “inextricably linked” to the protected characteristic.32 
She provides three examples where this arises. Discrimination on grounds of a 
person’s pregnancy, she says, is direct discrimination against the pregnant woman 
on grounds of sex “because it is capable of affecting women only.”33 Discrimination 
against a person on the basis of whether the person is entitled to an old-age 
pension is direct age discrimination because such a rule is “capable of having an 
effect only for the benefit or to the detriment of persons of a certain age.”34 Direct 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation against a couple arises “where a 
benefit provided for [married] couples is withheld from same-sex couples who … 
do not themselves have access to the institution of marriage.”35 The Advocate 
General held that, on the facts of the CHEZ case, the contested practice “is not as 
inextricably linked to their ethnic origin as pregnancy is to a person’s sex, as 
entitlement to an old-age pension is to a person’s age …”.36 Living in the targeted 
district was not “inextricably” linked to Roma ethnicity because there were many 
in the district who were not Roma. 
 
But how far might the AG’s second approach go? There is a lengthy 
jurisprudence in the United Kingdom on these questions, and if the practice there 
is anything to go on, this is likely to be a source of further tricky references to the 
CJEU. To give just one example: is it direct ethnic discrimination if less favourable 
treatment is accorded someone on the basis of whether a person is Jewish 
according to Jewish religious law (“Halacha”)?37 In particular, where, exactly, is the 
dividing line between this second approach to direct discrimination and the concept 
of indirect discrimination? 
 
  
																																																						
32 AG, at paragraph [86]. 
33 AG, at paragraph [83]. 
34 AG, at paragraph [83]. 
35 AG, at paragraph [83]. 
36 AG, at paragraph [86]. 
37 E v Governing Body of JFS, see above, at footnote 16. 
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The meaning and practice of “indirect” discrimination 
 
If the CHEZ case, in retrospect, may be seen as significantly blurring the boundaries 
between direct and indirect discrimination, it may also be seen as expanding the 
potential of indirect discrimination itself, at least in so far as domestic jurisprudence 
and domestic legislation in some Member States understands the concept. In this 
expansion, the Advocate General and the Grand Chamber appear to stand shoulder 
to shoulder. 
 
There are two main aspects of the approach to indirect discrimination in the 
Advocate General’s Opinion and the Judgment of the Court to which attention 
should be drawn. The first concerns the conceptual meaning of indirect 
discrimination. In quick succession, the Advocate General and the Court make three 
important conceptual points: (i) the term “apparently” in the definition of direct 
discrimination (as in, “where an apparently neutral provision …”) does not refer to 
a practice that is “manifestly” neutral, but one that is “ostensibly” neutral;38 (ii) if 
the contested measure was introduced because those affected were targeted on 
the basis of their protected characteristic, then that amounts to direct rather than 
indirect discrimination;39 (iii) the term “put … at a particular disadvantage” does 
not mean that a particularly serious disadvantage must be identified, but rather 
that there is indirect discrimination wherever the contested practice affects 
members of a protected group, in the words of the Advocate General, “more 
adversely” than others.40 
 
Whilst important in clarifying the concept of indirect discrimination in these 
fundamental respects, none of these points should come as any real surprise to 
practitioners. More surprising, and potentially more significant in terms of changing 
litigation practice in some Member States, is the second main aspect of the 
Advocate General’s and the Court’s approach to indirect discrimination. This 
involves expanding the range of those who are able to mount an indirect 
discrimination complaint, an expansion due to the application of the concept of 
“discrimination by association” to indirect discrimination. 
 
The issue arose because Ms Nikolova’s claim of indirect discrimination, like 
her claim of direct discrimination, was not based on she herself being Roma but 
																																																						
38 AG, at paragraph [92]; CJEU, at paragraph [93]. 
39 CJEU, at paragraph [95]. 
40 AG, at paragraph [93]. 
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was rather based on her being, in the words of the Advocate General quoted above, 
“collaterally damaged”41 by the indirect discrimination that primarily affected the 
Roma group, because it was they who predominated in the district targeted for the 
special measures taken by the company. Although not put in these terms, she 
suffers what might be called “indirect indirect discrimination”, and both the 
Advocate General and the Court accepted that such a claim should be allowed under 
the Directive.42 The important point here is not just that such a claim is permitted 
under the EU equality directives, but that (following CHEZ) such a claim is required 
under national law for national law to be regarded as properly implementing these 
directives. 
 
This means in practice that those Member States that only permit 
allegations of indirect discrimination to be made by members of the group 
adversely affected, or by a body specially designated to take such cases in the 
public interest, and not by others (such as Ms Nikolova), are now in violation of EU 
equality law. This is a significant expansion, in at least some Member States, in the 
range of those who must now be permitted under national laws to be able to litigate 
indirect discrimination claims.  
 
The approach adopted in the United Kingdom, for example, would appear 
now not to comply with the equality directives, as interpreted by the CJEU in CHEZ. 
In the Equality Act 2010, the definition of indirect discrimination is as follows:43 a 
person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion 
or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic 
of B's. A provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant 
protected characteristic of B's if each of four conditions is satisfied: if A applies, or 
would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic; and if it 
puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular 
disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it; and if 
it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage; and if A cannot show it to be a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. All four of these criteria must 
be satisfied for it to amount to indirect discrimination. 
 
As can be seen, the highlighted provision in the approach taken in the UK 
would clearly exclude someone in the position of Ms Nikolova, and it would appear 
																																																						
41 AG, at paragraph [58]. 
42 AG, at paragraph [61]; CJEU, at paragraph [60]. 
43 Equality Act 2010, section 19. 
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that, as a result of the CHEZ case, the UK is in violation of EU law. The implications 
of this broadening in the practice of indirect discrimination are of some importance. 
 
If this broader approach is applied in the sex discrimination context, for 
example, it would appear to require national law to permit a man working in the 
same pay grade as a group of women to take an equal value pay claim against his 
employer, based on the discrimination against the women compared, provided he 
could show that his wages were adversely affected because he worked in a pay 
grade dominated by women. Whether this is a progressive development is, 
perhaps, open to debate.  
 
On the one hand, it may lead to indirect discrimination being more widely 
used than it appears to be at the moment. It is notoriously the case that indirect 
discrimination has been underutilised in comparison with direct discrimination and 
that the effect of this underuse has been to leave considerable areas of institutional 
or structural discrimination unchallenged. On the other hand, it could lead to the 
major method by which such structural discrimination can be challenged being 
increasingly occupied and moulded by litigation brought by members of groups 
which are only tangentially affected (“collaterally damaged”) by the structural 
discrimination, with the potential that the voices of the groups primarily affected 
will be more marginalised than if they had been the primary litigants. It has long 
been a source of complaint that the major beneficiaries of some types of sex 
discrimination claims have been men; the application of “discrimination by 
association” to indirect discrimination could become another example of the same 
phenomenon. 
 
“Objective justification” in indirect discrimination 
 
The third significant issue that the CJEU addresses concerns the scope of the 
“objective justification” that applies in the indirect discrimination context. Both the 
Advocate General and the Court carefully set out the approach that the referring 
court must adopt when it is assessing the claims of “objective justification” 
advanced by the company for the contested practice.44 There are two main 
requirements which the domestic court must find to be satisfied before it can 
uphold a claim of objective justification: the action must be in pursuit of a 
																																																						
44	AG, at paragraph [111]; CJEU, at paragraph [113].	
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“legitimate aim”; and the means of achieving that aim must be appropriate and 
necessary (the requirement of “proportionality”). 
 
The Court accepts that, in the context of the CHEZ case itself, the prevention 
of fraud and other unlawful conduct could, in theory, constitute a legitimate aim, 
but stresses the need for the court to go beyond simply identifying the theoretical 
legitimacy of the aim. The domestic court must assess whether a legitimate aim is 
actually being pursued. As the Court says, the “company has the task at the very 
least of establishing objectively, first, the actual existence and extent of that 
unlawful conduct and, second, … the precise reasons for which there is, as matters 
currently stand, a major risk in the district concerned that such damage and 
unlawful connections to meters will continue.”45 As regards the means adopted, the 
court must “determine whether other appropriate and less restrictive measures … 
exist for the purpose of achieving the aims invoked by CHEZ.”46 And, like the 
Advocate General, the Court also points to the need to take into account the 
legitimate interest of the consumers of electricity “in having access to the supply 
of electricity in conditions which do not have an offensive or stigmatising effect.”47 
 
The Court goes further, however, than merely leading the referring court 
through the issues that it must address. It concludes the section of its judgment in 
which it addresses “objective justification” with a none-too-subtle steer, in case the 
referring court had not picked up the signals that the Court was sending. Although 
the Court recognises that it is “for the referring court to carry out the final 
assessments which are necessary” in deciding whether the company has 
established an “objective justification”,48 the Court states clearly: “it seems that it 
necessarily follows from the taking into account of all the foregoing criteria that the 
practice at issue cannot be justified … since the disadvantages caused by the 
practice appear disproportionate to the objectives pursued.”49  
 
What is driving the Court’s anti-discrimination jurisprudence? 
 
It is likely to become a topic of considerable scholarly debate, as well as practical 
importance, as to why the Court adopts the positions it does in CHEZ. There are 
several difficulties in divining the Court’s motivation. There is, first, the fact that 
																																																						
45 CJEU, at paragraph [116]. 
46 CJEU, at paragraph [122]. 
47 AG, at paragraph [132]; CJEU, at paragraph [124]. 
48 CJEU, at paragraph [127]. 
49	CJEU, at paragraph [127].	
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CHEZ cannot be taken as an isolated case and it must be set in the wider context 
of the Court’s recent jurisprudence as a whole – a task that is well beyond the 
scope of this brief article. There is, second, the fact that the Court itself is generally 
notoriously unforthcoming in articulating the deeper principles that may be driving 
its approach to anti-discrimination law, and this lack of transparency is noticeable 
in CHEZ too.  
 
These caveats aside, however, there are hints in the Court’s judgment and 
clearer (if still cursory) statements in Advocate General Kokott’s opinion that 
several values animate the approach they take in the case. There are three ideas 
in particular that recur in the opinion and/or the judgment: stigma, offence and 
humiliation.50 As perceived by the Advocate General and the Court, particularly the 
former, the practice of the company is imbued with an approach to the Roma 
residents of the districts targeted that seems, at best, careless of the humiliating 
effect of the special measures adopted and unconcerned if all in the district are 
stigmatized by the company’s practice, and at worst, calculated to produce just 
such humiliation and stigma. If the analysis suggested in this article of the Court’s 
understanding of the context of the case is correct, then it is uncertain how far the 
Court in CHEZ can really be seen as adopting general principles of European anti-
discrimination law in areas in which such a degree of stigma and humiliation are 
less apparent in practice. Although expressed as interpretations of equality law of 
general application, ultimately what we see in CHEZ, perhaps, is an example of the 
fracturing of EU equality law, with the particular protected ground in question and 
even the particular protected group involved, being the real determinants of the 
approach adopted.51  
 
And perhaps that is preferable to the adoption of a general theory of EU 
equality law tout court that sees the avoidance of humiliation and stigma as the 
overall purpose of equality law across all grounds, and across all protected groups. 
There is a telling moment in the Advocate General’s opinion where she appears to 
see the whole of EU anti-discrimination law through the lens of harassment (from 
which she appears to derive ideas of offensiveness, humiliation, and stigma), which 
seems too much like the proverbial tale wagging the proverbial dog.52 Whilst 
adopting a highly expressive analysis of the function of EU equality law may be 
																																																						
50 “Humiliation”: AG, at paragraphs [60] and [133]; “stigma”: AG, at paragraphs [4], 49, [60], [66], 
[95], [101], [129], [131], [132], [135], [139], [147]; CJEU, at paragraphs [87], [108], [124], [128]; 
“offence”: CJEU, at paragraphs [87], {108], [124], [128], [129]. 
51 See the earlier discussion in Christopher McCrudden, “Thinking About the Discrimination Directives”, 
1(1) European Anti-Discrimination Law Review 17 (2005). 
52 AG, at paragraph [133]. 
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progressive in the context of dealing with discrimination against the Roma people 
as in the CHEZ case, it may be much less progressive if it means that only practices 
that are demeaning, humiliating, and stigmatizing are addressed aggressively, or 
if they are regarded as being at the core of anti-discrimination law. If that were to 
become the new norm, it would be far from progressive. However important it is 
to address discriminatory practices of that type, anti-discrimination law is more, 
much more, than that, although what exactly remains stubbornly problematic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
